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Abstract: A tension seems to lie at the heart of Gödel’s work on the epistemology and metaphysics of mathematics. On the one hand he seems to advocate a kind of platonism on which we have a quasi-perceptual grasp of the mathematical realm and certain axioms force themselves upon us as being true. On the other hand he is famous for (allegedly) saying that kinds of platonism cannot satisfyany critical mind. In this paper, I will argue that Gödel’s notebooks are informative for understanding and dissolving this tension. By drawing on his remarks, I’ll tentatively propose that there’s a viable interpretation of Gödel on which he holds a form of representationalism about mathematics. On this view we are able to form coherent, quasi-perceptual representations of mathematical reality, but they may be better or worse. Using this, I’ll argue that the use of Gödel as a kind of non-naturalistic piñata in the philosophy of mathematics is wholly unjustified, and that his work can be used as an inspiration for developing naturalist epistemologies of mathematics.

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This is an online conference, comprising both YouTube videos and an online panel session. The panel session will be Wednesday 20th March 2024, 0900-1000 UTC + 0, 1700-1800 SGT. A Zoom link will be distributed prior to the panel session via email (please sign up via the link above to receive it). YouTube videos of the talks (which can be watched prior to the panel session) are below.

Panelists:
Shannon Hayes. Project Coordinator, Children on the Move, International Organization for Migration IOM.
Dr. Prithvi Hirani. Program Officer, IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM).
Dr. Nando Lewis. Project Officer, IOM, DTM Global Support Team.
Esther Mulwa. Data Consultant, DTM and PhD Candidate, City University, London

The panel session will be based on the following videos.

Videos: 
Neil Barton: (2 min)
Nando Lewis: (21 min)
Shannon Hayes: (12 min)
Prithvi Hirani and Esther Mulwa: (25 min)

Description. Data and computational reasoning play a critical role in humanitarian action. We need fast data-driven solutions to important and pressing problems. But what are some of the challenges faced by experts in this sector? And how might academia learn from and contribute to this area of research? This online conference, combining a mixture of YouTube videos and an online panel session, aims bring together academics and experts working on displacement.

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This will be a talk at the London Philosophy and the Formal Sciences Seminar on 28 February.

Abstract: I consider inquiry in mathematics and suggest that it supports an account of inquiry as concerned with epistemic improvement. I further argue that two norms of inquiry; that we should regard the questions we inquire into as sound and we should not know their answers, are incorrect (at least for some kinds of inquiry).

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This will be a talk in the NUS Logic Seminar on 21 February 2024.

Abstract: A popular view in the philosophy of set theory is that of potentialism: the position that the set-theoretic universe unfolds as more sets come into existence or become accessible to us. This often gets formalised using modal logic, but there is always a question of how to move to non-modal theories. In this latter regard, a difficult question for the potentialist is to explain how intensional entities (entities individuated by an application condition rather than an extension) behave, and in particular what logic governs them. This talk will discuss some work in progress on this issue. We’ll see how to motivate acceptance of different propositional logics for different flavours of potentialism, and discuss the prospects for proving results about the kinds of first-order theories validated.

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This will be a talk on Monday 11th December in the Center for Philosophy and the Sciences Lunch Forum at Universitetet i Oslo.

Abstract: A recent position in the foundations of mathematics borrows its terminology from physics, namely the Multiverse View. This position states that there is not one universe containing all the sets, but rather many. At first glance, it looks like this view doesn’t share so much with the view in physics beyond somehow involving talk of multiple universes. For a start, the set-theoretic multiverse (realistically understood) is composed of mathematical abstracta, whereas the physical multiverse contains many concreta.

In this talk, I want to explore the extent to which this idea is more than a mere similarity of catchy terminology. In particular, I’ll suggest that an important motivation of each is fine-tuning; the idea that if there was just one universe, then it would be (seemingly without good grounds!) set up with very precise anthropocentric constraints. I’ll use these observations to explore what each view can learn from the other and whether there are common pitfalls to be mindful of.