Slides here. Paused slides here. This will be a talk at HoMeWork 8 at New York University on 16 November 2025.

Abstract:

In light of the development of forcing, philosophers and mathematicians have wondered whether the truths of mathematics might be contingent. This talk investigates that idea in the framework of higher-order logic. Our main result is that forcing-related contingency (e.g., contingency of the continuum hypothesis) is consistent in the higher-order logic Bacon and Dorr call Classicism + Rigid Comprehension, which permits quantification over both properties and modally rigid classes.

This will be a talk at NUSC Philosophy.

Slides here.

Slides here.
This will be a talk at Philo-Bytes @ NYGH: Inter-school Dialogues on 11th September 2025
Abstract: Computers have become an integral part of everyday life. Probably, right now, you’re reading this blurb on an electronic computing device. From humble beginnings, the computer has become a seemingly all powerful force. This feeling has been compounded in the last few years by the development of machine learning techniques, yielding powerful technologies for detecting cancer, learning new fields, and producing decent essays. This all raises the question: Is there anything computers can’t do? In this talk we’ll see some limitations of computers and computations, and discuss our place in a world where more and more tasks are delegated to them.

Slides here.

This will be a talk at a one day workshop in Oslo.

Slides here.

This will be a talk at the Set Theory Work in Progress Seminar on 10th January 2025.

Abstract: The Continuum Hypothesis featured top of Hilbert’s list of 23 problems in 1900. Today, we still consider the question, with various programmes pulling in different directions. This conceptual diversity raises a puzzle; in what sense are our thoughts about sets and the Continuum Hypothesis the same? In what sense do we disagree when we talk about it? A standard assumption takes it that one must either accept the full determinacy or radical indeterminacy of set-theoretic claims; that there is either no disagreement or complete disagreement about a unique intended subject matter. In this paper, I argue for a possible middle-ground. Assuming a representationalist view of how content is determined, I argue that whilst the Continuum Hypothesis can mean different things to different agents, it can also be determinate within certain communities.